Conditionality and election performance within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy: the case of the 2012 and 2013 elections in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine by Nasieniak, Magdalena & Depo, Bogdana
www.ssoar.info
Conditionality and election performance within the
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy:
the case of the 2012 and 2013 elections in Armenia,
Georgia and Ukraine
Nasieniak, Magdalena; Depo, Bogdana
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Nasieniak, M., & Depo, B. (2013). Conditionality and election performance within the framework of the European
Neighbourhood Policy: the case of the 2012 and 2013 elections in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine. (IEP Policy Papers
on Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 3). Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik e.V. (IEP). https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-393111
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
CONDITIONALITY AND ELECTION
PERFORMANCE WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE
EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
The Case of the 2012 and 2013 Elections in 
Armenia, Georgia und Ukraine
Magdalena Nasieniak/Bogdana Depo
IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and Central Asia
No. 3 
published in June 2013
Dialog Europa Otto Wolff - Stiftung
The EU’s policy towards Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
– A key role for Germany
IE
P 
Po
lic
y 
Pa
pe
rs
 o
n 
Ea
st
er
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 C
en
tr
al
 A
si
a
2
About the author
Magdalena Nasieniak is a PhD candidate at the University of Bath. Her research focuses on European 
foreign policy making in the post-Lisbon context. She was a Visiting Researcher at the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (Brussels) and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (Warsaw). She 
studied at the University of Aberdeen (MRes) and University of Wroclaw (MA).
Bogdana Depo is EXACT Marie Curie Researcher currently researching at the University of Cologne 
and at Charles University Prague. In the framework of the PhD programme she was a Visiting 
Researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) and the European Institute of Public 
Administration (Maastricht). She holds MAs in International Law from the College of Europe 
(Natolin) and Kiev National University. 
About IEP
Since 1959, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) has been active in the fi eld of European 
integration as a non-profi t organisation. It is one of Germany’s leading research institutes on foreign 
and European policy. 
IEP works at the interface of academia, politics, administration, and civic education. In doing so, IEP’s 
task include scientifi c analyses of problems surrounding European politics and integration, as well as 
promotion of the practical application of its research fi ndings. | www.iep-berlin.de
About the series
IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and Central Asia are published in the framework of the research 
project “The EU’s policy towards Eastern Europe and Central Asia – A key role for Germany”. This 
project, which aims at analysing the EU’s relations with its East European and Central Asian partners 
and the role of Germany therein, is led by the deputy director of IEP, Dr. Katrin Böttger and fi nancially 
supported by the Otto Wolff-Foundation.
The Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) is a strategic partner of the European Commission, which 
supports its activities. This paper, like all publications in this series, represents only the view of its 
authors. Copyright of this paper series is held by the Institut für Europäische Politik.
Editorial team
Publisher: Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp, Director, IEP
Executive Editor: Dr. Katrin Böttger, Deputy Director, IEP/ Dr. Funda Tekin, IEP
Editorial Staff: Dorothee Pätzold, IEP
Layout: Sebastian von Stosch, IEP
Dialog Europa Otto Wolff - StiftungPublished in June 2013
IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and C
entral Asia
3
Abstract
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU brought conditionality to the fore of the reviewed 
European Neighbourhood Policy. This paper examines the substance and application of 
conditionality based on the example of the recent elections in the Eastern Partnership countries. 
It is contended that the new approach offers more clarity with regard to the application of 
conditionality. The analysis of the EU’s response shows stronger conditionality as positive election 
assessments are rewarded with additional fi nancial assistance and facilitation of the Association 
Agreements’ negotiations (including trade and visa liberalisation). However, even though ‘free and 
fair elections’ now constitute the most concrete  benchmark of democratisation, there is still a lack 
of coherent methodology to assess election performance in this respect. In the fi nal section, the 
authors present recommendations for the EU’s approach to election performance in the countries 
of the Eastern Partnership. 
Keywords: conditionality, democratisation, election assessment, European Neighbourhood Policy
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1. Introduction 
The events of the Arab Spring reinforced the 
accusations aimed at the EU’s double-standard 
practice of pursuing relations with authoritarian 
regimes under the normative framework of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
The new approach, as presented in the Joint 
Communication by the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine 
Ashton, and the Commissioner for Enlargement 
and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, 
in May 2011, brought the issues of democracy and 
human rights to the fore of the EU’s action. Under 
the new buzz phrase ‘more for more and less for 
less’1, the EU aimed to reinforce its conditionality 
by increasingly adjusting the level of fi nancial 
assistance and cooperation to match the pace of 
economic and political reform in the neighbouring 
countries. This - combined with more concrete 
benchmarking and fl exible incentivisation - was 
supposed to address long-standing issues limiting 
the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the 
substance and application of the reinforced 
conditionality in the case of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) in the example of election 
performance. The importance of conducting 
elections according to international standards 
has been included in bilateral and multilateral 
documents between the EU and its neighbouring 
countries and further emphasised under the 
new approach. The Joint Communication by 
Ashton and Füle in May 2011 listed ‘free and 
fair elections’ as one of the main measurements 
of a ‘deep and sustainable democracy’. It is thus 
argued that election performance, which is now 
at the core of the ENP’s conditionality, presents 
one of the most concrete benchmarks used by 
the EU to determine the level of assistance and 
cooperation with the neighbouring countries. This 
paper will thus analyse what the EU’s indicators 
1  High Representative and the European Commission, ‘A New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, Joint Communication COM(2011) 
303, accessed April 4, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com_11_303_en.pdf.
of ‘free and fair’ elections are and how the EU’s 
assessment is then translated into the framework 
of the ENP’s conditionality. Subsequently, with 
the example of the recent elections in Armenia, 
Georgia and Ukraine, it examines how this new 
approach is applied in practice. 
This analysis demonstrates that the EU’s 
assessment of the elections is based predominantly 
on the preliminary reports by the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Offi ce for 
Democracy and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), 
since neither the European Commission nor the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) are 
directly involved in the election observation 
missions in the EaP countries. The 2012 
parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections in 
Armenia were generally assessed positively since 
improvements were registered in comparison 
with the 2008 presidential elections. In the case 
of Georgia, the positive assessment of the 2012 
parliamentary elections was based on the peaceful 
recognition of the results by the current president 
Mikheil Saakashvili and the subsequent transfer of 
power to the opposition forces. Both Armenia and 
Georgia received additional fi nancial assistance 
and further facilitation of the negotiations on 
the Association Agreements (AA), including 
further trade and visa liberalisation. With regard 
to Ukraine, the 2012 parliamentary election 
performance constituted a signifi cant deterioration 
of standards compared to the previous elections. 
The signing of the AA was further conditioned by 
progress made on the problematic issues identifi ed 
by the EU, two of which were electoral reform and 
application of selective justice. Consequently, the 
positive or negative nature of the EU’s assessment 
was determined by the conduct of the previous 
elections and does not suffi ciently refl ect on the 
actual level of democratisation of the country. 
Although ‘free and fair elections’ now constitute 
the most concrete benchmark of democratisation, 
there is still a lack of a coherent methodology  to 
assess election performance in this context. In the 
fi nal section, the authors present recommendations 
for the EU’s approach to election performance in 
the EaP countries.
IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and C
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2. Democratisation, Condi-
tionality and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
The 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy was 
an answer to the EU’s recent enlargement and the 
shifting of its borders further to the East and South. 
Based on the same operating principle of positive 
conditionality as the enlargement policy, the EU’s 
aim was to foster democratisation and stabilisation 
in its direct neighbourhood by offering fi nancial 
assistance and political dialogue .2 However, the 
policy lacked suffi cient conditionality without the 
powerful incentive of membership. Furthermore, 
it was often criticised for its vague formulation 
of intended outcomes, which undermines the 
effective assessment of the countries’ progress. 
The EaP initiative was an attempt to address 
these shortcomings and offer a framework for 
cooperation based on tangible benchmarks, clear 
timelines and on-going evaluation linked to the 
subsequent differentiation of the EU’s support.3 
The lack of membership perspective was to be 
compensated for by several smaller incentives: 
Association Agreements including Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), 
visa liberalisation, and additional funding to help 
with costly and laborious adjustments.4 However, 
the already weak conditionality was constantly 
challenged by uneven application caused by the 
2  The 2003 European Commission’s Communication provided the 
foundations for positive conditionality by stating that ‘in return 
for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective 
implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, 
including aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbours 
should benefi t from the prospect of closer integration with the 
EU’. European Commission, ‘Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: 
A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours Wider Europe’, Communication COM(2003) 104 
fi nal, accessed April 4, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com03_104_en.pdf.
3  European Commission, ‘Eastern Partnership’, Commission 
SEC(2008) 2974, accessed April 5, 2013, http://eurlex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0823:EN:
NOT. 
4   A new fi nancial instrument, the Governance Facility, was designed 
in 2008 to be used fl exibly for additional funding, rewarding the 
neighbouring countries most advanced in their reforms and thus 
strengthening the application of the EU’s positive conditionality. 
European Commission, ‘Principles for Implementation of a 
Governance Facility under ENPI’, Note, accessed April 5, 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/governance_facility_en.pdf.
divergence of the EU’s – and, more importantly, 
of its Member States’ – interests and values. The 
interests-versus-values approach has undermined 
the EU’s effectiveness and credibility in both the 
southern and eastern neighbourhood. The events 
of the Arab Spring challenged this contradictory 
approach and forced the EU to admit its arguably 
hypocritical inconsistency and bring its interests in 
line with its values. 
The new approach called for a greater 
role of the civil society, the strengthening of 
mutual accountability and the feeling of joint 
ownership, particularly in the neighbouring 
countries. Reinforced conditionality in the form 
of ‘more for more and less for less’ was to allow 
for a greater differentiation among the partner 
countries, providing a framework of cooperation 
and assistance that would respond to their 
expectations and allow for tailor-made approaches 
‘in dealing with rapidly evolving partners and 
reform needs – whether they are experiencing fast 
regime change or a prolonged process of reform 
and democratic consolidation.’5 The EU has also 
recognised the role of the civil society, which is 
supposed to become much more involved in the 
policy planning, implementation and assessment. 
The emphasis was boosted by the establishment 
of the Civil Society Facility in September 2011, 
with an initial budget of €26 million for 2011. 
Additional funding would be the main incentive 
to keep the neighbouring countries on the path 
of democratisation and economic transition.6 
The funding is to become more fl exible in order 
to allow for swift adjustments in response to the 
performance of the neighbouring countries.7 
5  The High Representative and the European Commission, ‘A New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, Joint Communication COM(2011) 303: 
1, accessed April 4, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com_11_303_en.pdf. 
6  The European Commission has announced a €1.24 billion 
increase of its fi nancial assistance in the period 2011-13.
7  In December 2011, the European Commission introduced a new 
European Neighbourhood Instrument, which is to replace the 
current European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument in 
2014. It is to be much more policy-driven in order to allow for 
greater differentiation. European Commission, ‘Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Neighbourhood Instrument’, COM(2011) 839 fi nal, accessed 
April 4, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2011_prop_
eu_neighbourhood_instrument_reg_en.pdf.
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As stressed in the Joint Communication, the 
EU would base its fi nancial assistance for 2014 
onwards on the reform track record as presented in 
the annual progress reports. This assistance would 
refer to the indicators of a ‘deep democracy’ as 
well as to the individual goals set in the bilateral 
documents. Consequently, it can be argued that 
the new approach set conditions for stronger 
application of conditionality by introducing 
more fl exible funding instruments and clearer 
benchmarking. The emphasis on the normative 
dimension of the policy was refl ected by setting 
the ‘progress in building and consolidating 
democracy and respect for the rule of law’ as the 
general benchmark8. Under the term of a ‘deep 
democracy’, the EU specifi ed political indicators, 
with reference to which progress would be 
evaluated, with the conduct of free and fair 
elections being set as one of the main principles.9 
The example of the latter indicator will be used 
to examine the application of the new approach in 
practice. 
The three countries in question, Armenia, 
Georgia and Ukraine, are heterogeneous. They 
differ signifi cantly in terms of size, geographical 
location, European ambition and their relationship 
with Russia. Both Ukraine and Georgia underwent 
colour revolutions in 2003/2004, which triggered 
The EU’s fi nancial structure underwent further restructuring in 
June 2012 through the addition of the new fi nancial ‘umbrella’ 
programme Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation 
Programme (EaPIC), which is modelled on the previously 
operating Governance Facility. European Commission, 
‘Enhanced cooperation in the Eastern Partnership: the Eastern 
Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) programme’, 
MEMO/12/491, accessed April 5, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-12-491_en.htm. 
8  High Representative and the European Commission, ‘A New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, Joint Communication COM(2011) 303: 
1, accessed April 4, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com_11_303_en.pdf.
9 The remaining indicators are: (…) b) freedom of association, 
expression and assembly and a free press and media; c) the 
rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right 
to a fair trial; d) fi ghting against corruption; e) security and 
law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the 
establishment of democratic control over armed and security 
forces. The High Representative and the European Commission, 
‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review 
of European Neighbourhood Policy’, Joint Communication 
COM(2011) 303: 3, accessed April 4, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/
world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf.
democratic and economic transformations. Until 
recently, Ukraine was the frontrunner among the 
EaP countries in terms of democratic transition 
and integration with the EU. Georgia’s impressive 
economic transition did not result in an equally 
impressive democratic record. Armenia’s 
authoritarian style of governance was reinforced 
in the aftermath of the contested presidential 
elections in 2008. The EU’s infl uence on 
transformation in these countries has been limited 
by the ambiguity of its offer and the lack of a 
suffi cient incentive, namely membership, as well 
as by the geopolitical relevance of the Russian 
factor. The lack of signifi cant engagement of the 
EU in confl ict resolution in the cases of Georgia 
and Armenia has also limited the credibility of the 
EU’s action in this region. Consequently, rather 
than strictly applying the ENP’s conditionality, 
the EU’s efforts to foster the democratisation 
of this region have been limited to rhetorical 
declarations. 
3. Election Performance and 
the Eastern Partnership
The conduct of free and fair elections has been 
emphasised in the ENP’s bilateral and multilateral 
documents as one of the key measurements of 
the progress toward democratisation and good 
governance. Nevertheless, the EU has not been 
directly involved in election observation in the 
neighbouring countries, and the reference to 
election performance was rather narrowly defi ned 
in the Action Plans, referring to the OSCE/ODIHR 
assessments and recommendations (see table 1). 
Consequently, the EU assessment is based on the 
OSCE/ODIHR methodology of assessing election 
performance.
The OSCE/ODIHR has been the primary 
election observer in all of its 57 member states, 
with a particular focus on the transition countries. 
The importance of holding democratic elections 
was emphasised in the founding documents 
and further stressed in the so called 1990 
Copenhagen Document issued by the Conference 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
which clarifi ed and defi ned the term “genuinely 
democratic elections” as universal, equal, fair, 
IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and C
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Countries Priorities for election performance 
according to the Action Plans 
2005/2006
Priorities for election Performance 
according to the Progress Reports 
2012
Armenia ‘ensure that the electoral framework is in full 
compliance with OSCE commitments and other 
international standards for democratic elections, 
by amending the Electoral Code and improving 
electoral administration in line with OSCE/ODIHR 
and CoE Venice Commission recommendations 
(during 2006)’
‘ensure free and fair parliamentary elections, in 
line with internationally recognised democratic 
standards; address identifi ed shortcomings in the 
electoral legislative framework, in a consultative 
and inclusive manner, in good time before the 
elections’
Georgia ‘ensure the local (2006), parliamentary (2008) 
and presidential (2009) elections in Georgia 
are conducted in accordance with international 
standards, through implementation of OSCE/
ODIHR and Council of Europe recommendations, 
notably regarding the need for a reliable voter 
registry and a functioning and transparent electoral 
commission’
‘ensure that the presidential elections scheduled 
for 2013 are in line with international standards 
by addressing the shortcomings identifi ed by the 
Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) of OSCE concerning the May 
2012 parliamentary elections’
Ukraine ‘ensuring the democratic conduct of presidential 
(2004) and parliamentary (2006) elections in 
Ukraine in accordance with OSCE standards’
‘prepare and conduct the 2012 parliamentary 
elections in line with the standards of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe - Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), including full co-
operation with monitoring missions’
• Hold free elections at reasonable intervals;
• Permit all seats in at least one chamber of the legislature to be popularly elected;
• Guarantee universal and equal suffrage;
• Respect the right of citizens to seek offi ce;
• Respect the right to establish political parties and ensure that parties can compete on the basis of equal treatment 
before the law and by the authorities;
• Ensure that political campaigning can be conducted in an open and fair atmosphere without administrative 
action, violence, intimidation or fear of retribution against candidates, parties or voters;
• Ensure unimpeded media access on a non-discriminatory basis;
• Ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot and that they are counted and reported honestly, with the results made 
public; and
• Ensure that candidates who receive the number of votes necessary to be elected are duly installed in offi ce and 
are permitted to remain in offi ce until their term expires.
Table 2. The OSCE/ODIHR’s standards for genuinely democratic elections 
Source: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Handbook (2010).1
1  OSCE, ‘Election Observation Handbook: Sixth Edition’, (Warsaw: Poligrafus Andrzej Adamiak, 2010), 18. Also available online, accessed 
February 12, 2013, htt p://www.osce.org/odihr/electi ons/68439.
Table 1. Priorities for election performance for Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine
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secret, free, transparent and accountable (for 
further standards see table 2).10 The OSCE/ODIHR 
recommendations are indirectly referred to in the 
EaP’s documents as one of the key indicators of 
democratisation and good governance. 
The ENP’s new approach was further 
operationalized in the new EaP Roadmaps 
presented in May 2012 in order to ‘to serve as a 
practical tool for monitoring and assessing the 
progress of the Eastern Partnership’11 ahead of 
the Vilnius summit in 2013. Under the bilateral 
dimension, the benchmark is set as ‘the progress 
made towards the political reforms needed to 
implement the Eastern Partnership’s common 
values, and the overall state of EU relations with 
partner countries’12; which refers in particular 
to the upcoming elections. With reference to 
election performance, the objective is, yet again, 
narrowly defi ned as ‘conduct of democratic 
and credible elections, in accordance with 
international standards’.13 There is no reference 
to election performance in the case of Ukraine, 
only indirectly to ‘building and strengthening 
institutions linked to democracy and the rule 
of law.’14 In Ukraine’s Association Agenda, the 
reference is limited to ‘ensuring the effectiveness 
of the electoral framework and environment 
so as to continue the conduct of presidential 
and parliamentary elections in accordance with 
international standards for democratic elections 
and the recommendations made by OSCE/
ODIHR’15.
10  CSCE, ‘Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE’, CSCE 
Document, accessed April 5, 2012, http://www.osce.org/odihr/
elections/14304. This has been the key OSCE document outlining 
commitments in the fi eld of elections, rule of law and other 
fundamental rights and freedoms.
11  The High Representative and European Commission, ‘Eastern 
Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit’, Joint 
Communication JOIN(2012) 13 fi nal: 3, accessed April 5, 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/.
12  High Representative and European Commission, ‘Eastern 
Partnership Roadmap 2012-13: the bilateral dimension’, Joint 
Staff Working Document SWD(2012) 109 fi nal: 6, accessed April 
5, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/e_
pship_bilateral_en.pdf.
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid, p. 8.  
15  European Commission, ‘EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to 
prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association 
Under the multilateral dimension, election 
performance is included in the fi rst thematic 
platform ‘Democracy, good governance and 
stability’.16 The main tool for improving election 
performance is to be implemented by the OSCE, 
predominantly within the framework of the EU-
funded EaP Facility. Further references are made 
to reforms in fi elds such as judicial reform and 
the fi ght against corruption, the strengthening of 
Ombudsman institutions, public administration 
reform, and pluralism of the media. Therefore, the 
EU’s pre-election assistance is supposed to result 
in improved compliance with and awareness of 
European electoral standards in the EaP countries 
by means of an administration that is better 
prepared and through the alignment of NGO and 
media sectors with the Code of Good Practice in 
Electoral Matters.17
As demonstrated above, the 2012 EaP 
Roadmaps show progress toward further 
operationalization and comprehensiveness 
of the EU’s approach to election assistance, 
with a particular emphasis on the role of civil 
society. Nevertheless, benchmarking of election 
assessment is still based on the OSCE/ODIHR 
assessments. 
4. Testing EU’s conditionali-
ty in action - the 2012/2013 
parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections
4.1 The 2012 Parliamentary Elec-
tions in Georgia
Georgia’s track record of rigged elections 
culminated in the 2003 parliamentary elections. 
The widespread and systematic fraud triggered 
street protests, leading to the Rose Revolution, 
Agreement’, Note: 6, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.eeas.
europa.eu/ukraine/docs/2010_eu_ukraine_association_agenda_
en.pdf.
16  High Representative and European Commission, ‘Eastern 
Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit’, Joint 
Communication JOIN(2012) 13 fi nal: 3, accessed April 5, 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/.
17  Council of Europe/Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice 
in Electoral Matters’, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.venice.
coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2002)023rev-e.aspx.
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which brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power as 
President. The parliamentary elections that were 
subsequently held in March 2004 were assessed 
as ‘the most democratic since independence’18. 
They provided strong democratic credentials for 
the new President, with his party winning two 
thirds of the seats in Parliament. The subsequent 
nine-year period brought a mixed record for 
Georgia. Extensive economic reforms, the visa 
liberalisation programme and the effective fi ght 
against corruption contributed to a modernised 
image of the country and a thriving business 
environment characterised by friendly legislation 
and, most of all, a reliable and predictable 
political environment.19 However, the democratic 
record was less favourable; according to the EaP 
Index, Georgia did not fully meet the criteria of 
‘electoral democracy’20, and Freedom House 
still assesses Georgia as only ‘partly free’.21 The 
lack of a genuinely competitive and pluralistic 
political system as well as media politicisation was 
identifi ed as obstacles to further democratisation.22 
The reformist decision-making process 
implemented by President Saakashvili and 
his party created a system characterised by a 
dominant and virtually unchecked executive and 
a political landscape dominated by the ruling 
party United National Movement (UNM)23. The 
marginalised opposition attempted to challenge 
the consolidation of power under Saakashvili’s 
leadership on the streets. This must also be seen 
18  For the assessment of Georgia’s elections see the OSCE/ODIHR 
reports: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia.
19  The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, 
‘Doing Business 2012 Doing Business in a More Transparent 
World’, Report: 12-13, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.
doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2012.
20  Iryna Solonenko, ed, European Integration Index for Eastern 
Partnership Countries, (IRF and OSF, 2012), 28. Also available 
online: http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/fi les/EaP%20
Index%202012_0.pdf.
21  Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2012’, Report, accessed 
February 20, 2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/
georgia.
22  Iryna Solonenko, ed, European Integration Index for Eastern 
Partnership Countries, (IRF and OSF, 2012), 28. Also available 
online: http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/fi les/EaP%20
Index%202012_0.pdf.
23  Transparency International, ‘The Georgian National Integrity 
2011’, Report, accessed February 20, 2013, htt p://transparency.
ge/nis/.
in light of the fact that the subsequent elections 
fell short of meeting international standards. 
In 2010, the Georgian parliament approved 
a set of constitutional amendments, which 
aimed at providing a more balanced model of 
governance by limiting some of the presidential 
powers and shifting them to the offi ce of the 
prime minister. Shortly after, efforts were 
undertaken to put Georgia on the path toward a 
parliamentary republic.24 The rather ambivalent 
democratic record of President Saakashvili 
prompted accusations that this legislative move 
was supposed to prolong his term in power by 
enabling him to take over the position of prime 
minister.25 The EU-Georgia relations intensifi ed 
in July 2010 with the launch of negotiations on 
the Association Agreement, which was seen as 
the EU’s recognition of the reformist approach of 
President Saakashvili.  The further intensifi cation 
of the relations was to be conditioned by the 2012 
parliamentary election performance as indicated 
in the 2012 Action Plan’s priorities.26 
Pre-election assessment
The pre-election period called the democratic 
commitment of President Saakashvili into 
question. In October 2011, a new political fi gure, 
billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, announced his 
plans to establish a political party and compete 
in the election. His citizenship was immediately 
revoked on the grounds that he held both the French 
and the Russian citizenship, despite the fact that 
Georgian citizens are not allowed to hold multiple 
citizenships.27 The emphasis on the democratic 
conduct of the elections was expressed in the 
24  For more on the constitutional reform see: Welt, C., ‘Georgia’s 
Constitutional Reform’, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute John 
Hopkins University, 2010, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.
cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5443; Matusiak, M., ‘Constitutional 
reform in Georgia: changing to stay the same?’ (Centre for 
Eastern Studies: Warsaw, 2010).
25  Jackson, A., ‘The New Georgian Constitution: Reading 
Saakashvili’, The Foreign Policy Centre, accessed February 20, 
2013, http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/1295.pdf.
26  For details on the text see table 2.
27  Barry, E., ‘From Philanthropist to Public Enemy in Georgia’, 
The New York Times, April 5, 2012, accessed April 5, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/world/europe/jump-to-
politics-turns-georgian-billionaire-into-public-enemy-no-1.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Conclusions of the Council of the European Union 
in February 2012.28 The EU also encouraged the 
Georgian authorities to address issues prevalent 
in the previous elections, such as lack of electoral 
code, irregular party funding and media access as 
well as the intimidation of opposition activists.29 
The substantial differences in size between the 
single-member parliamentary districts were also 
identifi ed as one of the key issues. 
The President’s administration managed to 
address some of the outstanding issues with a new 
electoral code, which was approved by Parliament 
in December 2011. Along with the new law on 
Political Unions of Citizens, these steps were 
aimed at regulating the area of party fi nance and 
campaign funding. The legislation, however, did 
not correspond suffi ciently to the recommendations 
made by the Venice Commission, and its drafting 
process lacked proper consultations with the main 
political players, thus undermining the general 
trust in the election process. It was criticised by 
civil society actors that the electoral environment 
had deteriorated rather than improved.30 
Furthermore, new election-related institutions 
were established – the Commission for Ensuring 
Voter List Accuracy and the Financial Monitoring 
Department of the State Audit Agency – to provide 
effi cient electoral management.
Civil society was actively engaged in the 
pre-election period. In February 2012, the joint 
campaign ‘This Affects You Too’ was launched 
by various NGOs and media outlets.31 Activists 
targeted the EU with a petition that demanded 
new amendments to the election legislation.32 In 
28  Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the 
South Caucasus’, 3149th Foreign Affairs Council February 
27, 2012), accessed February 2, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/
delegations/georgia/documents/news/20120305_01_en.pdf . 
29  For example in the 2010 municipal elections – see Waal de, 
T., ‘Political Reform in Georgia’, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2010, accessed April 15, 2013, http://
carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/20/reform-in-georgia/xf
30  For example see Open Society Georgia Foundation, ‘This Affects 
You Too’, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.osgf.ge/index.
php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=15&info_id=2640.
31  The website of the campaign www.esshengexeba.ge, the 
Facebook page of the campaign htt ps://www.facebook.com/
esshengexeba.
32 Georgian National Platform, ‘Letter to Commissioner Stefan 
Fü le’ (Tbilisi, March 12, 2012), accessed April 1, 2013, 
July, the ruling party announced a four-point code 
of conduct33, which was seen as insuffi cient and 
consequently rejected by the opposition and civil 
society. The latter drew up their own 17-point 
code of conduct34, which was accepted by the 
two main parties. Prior to the elections, the EU-
Georgia relations intensifi ed with the launch 
of the DCFTA talks in March 2012 and the visa 
dialogue in June 2012.35 In July 2012, during his 
visit to Georgia, Štefan Füle announced that an 
additional €22 million would be provided from 
the EaPIC to facilitate adjustments to the ongoing 
visa dialogue in the fi elds of criminal justice and 
border and migration management.36 
During a pre-election visit in August 2012, the 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly recognised the 
‘obvious pre-election efforts that aimed to ensure 
accuracy of the voters’ list, provide transparency in 
campaign fi nance, and expand media accessibility 
throughout the country.’37 However, observers 
also noted a growing political polarization in the 
country and the political targeting of opposition 
parties with high penalties by the State Audit 
Offi ce. Georgian authorities were called on 
to ensure ‘a level playing fi eld for all parties 
including access to media and the protection of 
journalists’38. The OSCE/ODIHR interim reports 
confi rmed that progress had been made in terms 
http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/news-events/news/georgian-national-
platform-letter-to-commissioner-Štefan-fule 
33  According to the code, the parties bind themselves (…)‘to 
reject vote-buying; to follow recommendations of civil society 
organizations and Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair 
Elections at the National Security Council in respect of use of 
administrative resources; to recognize election results summarized 
by the Central Election Commission and deemed legitimate 
by observer organizations with credible reputation’. The code 
is available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25003 
,accessed April 4, 2013.
34  Civil Georgia, ‘Parties Called to Agree on Broader Code of 
Conduct Ahead of Elections’, Civil. Ge, July 16, 2012, accessed 
April 5, 2013, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25010.
35  EEAS, ‘EU-Georgia relations’, EEAS website, accessed April 5, 
2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm.
36  Civil Georgia, ‘The Eastern Partnership, Georgia and the 
European Union’, Civil. Ge, July 10, 2012, accessed May 4, 2013, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24983.
37  OSCE, ‘OSCE PA concluded pre-election visit to Georgia’, Press 
Release August 22, 2012, accessed January 1, 2013, http://www.
oscepa.org/news-a-media/press-releases/1055-georgia-previsit-
end.
38  Ibid.
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of the legislative framework, but also pointed 
out existing problems relating to party fi nancing 
and the use of administrative resources by the 
incumbent authorities. 39 The second report further 
emphasised the confrontational and rough tone of 
the campaign and the uneven playing fi eld.
 In September’s joint statement, High 
Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle 
restated that the elections would determine 
the intensity of further relations and called 
for ‘a peaceful, enabling and competitive 
electoral environment and also a healthy media 
environment’.40 They also pointed out that the 
growing polarisation could produce a lack of 
recognition of the fi nal results among political 
actors. The fi nal run-up to the elections was 
marked by further tensions over recorded 
instances of prisoner abuse, which prompted 
accusations and street protests against the 
Saakashvili administration.41 
Election assessment
The parliamentary elections held in Georgia 
on October 1, 2012 resulted in the victory of 
the Ivanishvili-led opposition block Georgian 
Dream. After initially claiming victory, President 
Saakashvili accepted the results and announced 
his party’s move to the opposition. This peaceful 
transfer of power established cohabitation and was 
in stark contrast to the violent political rhetoric 
of the pre-electoral phase. The preliminary 
statement issued jointly by OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, PACE, EP and NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly stated that the ‘elections 
marked an important step in consolidating the 
conduct of democratic elections (…) although 
certain key issues remain to be addressed. (…)
The environment (…) was polarized and tense, 
characterized by the use of harsh rhetoric and 
39  OSCE/ODIHR, ‘Election Observation Mission Georgia 
Parliamentary Elections’, Interim Report No. 1, 22, accessed 
April 4, 2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/93609.
40  High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle, ‘On EU-
Georgia relations and the upcoming elections’, MEMO/12/640, 
accessed April 15, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-12-640_en.htm.
41  This was also refl ected in the EU’s criticism by High 
Representative Ashton. Nielsen, N., ‘EU condemns Georgia 
prison rape, torture’, EU Observer, September 21, 2012, accessed 
February 20, 2013, http://euobserver.com/foreign/117627.
some instances of violence. The campaign often 
centred on the advantages of incumbency, on the 
one hand, and private fi nancial assets, on the other, 
rather than on concrete political platforms and 
programs.’42 
Similarly to the opinion of the international 
community, the Georgian national platform of 
the Civil Society Forum recognised the election 
performance as ‘an important step forward 
for Georgia’s democratic development, which 
lays the ground for accelerating the country’s 
integration with the EU.’43 The NDI’s statement 
restated that ‘the elections were the most 
competitive in a decade and marked an important 
step in establishing a pluralist legislature’.44 The 
observers also called for the development of ‘a 
consultative and participatory legislative process 
the parliamentary minority will have to share in 
the responsibilities of governing’.45
EU’s response 
In their joint statement, High Representative 
Ashton and Commissioner Füle acknowledged 
the OSCE/ODIHR preliminary statement and 
assessed election performance as generally 
positive, indicating Georgia’s commitment to a 
democratic path. They called for the development 
of constructive cohabitation and reaffi rmed the 
EU’s further cooperation with a new government. 
46 The peaceful transition of power reinforced 
the overall positive assessment of the election 
performance, which was seen as an indicator of 
42  OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA, et al., ‘International Election 
Observation Georgia — Parliamentary Election’ Statement of 
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, accessed April 4, 2013, 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/94593.
43  Georgian National Platform, ‘Statement by the Eastern 
Partnership’s Georgian National Platform on the parliamentary 
election and the role of civil society’, Statement 5.10.2012, 
accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.eap-csf.eu/assets/fi les/
Downloads/english/NP_Post_Election_Statementgeorgia2012_
ENG.pdf.
44  NDI, ‘Statement of the NDI Election Observer Delegation to 
Georgia’s 2012 Parliamentary Elections’, Statement October 2, 
2012, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.ndi.org/fi les/Georgia-
Election-Statement-100212-ENG.pdf.
45  Ibid.
46  The High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle, ‘On 
the results of Georgia’s parliamentary elections’, Joint Statement 
A 433/12, accessed May 4, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132699.pdf.
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progress towards democratic transition on the part 
of President Saakashvili.47 
During his post-election visit to Tbilisi, 
Commissioner Füle confi rmed the EU’s support 
for Georgia and its new government. Expressing 
satisfaction with the overall election performance, 
he also called for the new government and the 
opposition to create a constructive political 
environment of cooperation. During her visit to 
Tbilisi in November, High Representative Ashton 
launched negotiations on joint crisis management 
operations, and she further acknowledged the 
commitment to a rapid conclusion of the DCFTA, 
improving the mobility as well as ensuring the 
continuation of high-level exchanges and the EU’s 
support. 48
The subsequent period of cohabitation 
between Prime Minister Ivanishvili and President 
Saakashvili resulted in the further polarisation 
of the political situation. The prosecution cases 
launched in the post-election period against 
former governmental offi cials49 prompted fears 
of selective justice and were characterised by 
the EU as ‘retribution against political rivals’50. 
Furthermore, President Saakashvili and his 
opposition party, perceiving recent steps to 
improve relations with Russia as attempts to divert 
the course of Georgian foreign policy from the 
path of European integration, called for enshrining 
a European orientation of Georgian foreign policy 
in the constitution.51 In December 2012, the ruling 
47  Central Election Commission of Georgia, ‘Summary Protocol of 
the Elections of the Parliament of Georgia of October 1, 2012’, 
Summary Protocol, accessed May 4, 2013, http://cesko.ge/
fi les/2012/SUMMARY_PROTOCOL_2012.pdf.
48  Catherine Ashton, ‘Remarks by High Representative/Vice 
President Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to Georgia,’ 
MEMO/12/903, accessed May 4, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-12-903_en.htm.
49  Gorchinskaya, K., ‘In Kyiv, Saakashvilii says he does not fear 
arrest’, Kyiv Post, November 27, 2012, accessed May 5, 2013, 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv/in-kyiv-saakashvili-says-
he-does-not-fear-arrest-316779.html.
50  Catherine Ashton, ‘Remarks by High Representative/Vice 
President Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to Georgia,’ 
MEMO/12/903, accessed May 4, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-12-903_en.htm.
51  Civil Georgia, ‘PM Rules Out Trade-Off on Constitutional 
Changes with UNM’, Civil.ge Daily News Online, February 5, 
2013, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=25719.
party presented a draft of constitutional changes, 
which aimed at further restricting the powers of 
the president’s offi ce. The post-election period 
indicated that Georgia might be reneging on 
its commitment to democratisation, following 
consolidation of power under the new prime 
minister Ivanishvili.52 
High Representative Ashton, visiting Georgia 
in November 2012, called for an impartial and 
transparent investigation of previous authorities in 
order to clarify accusations of selective justice.53 
As part of the Informal EaP Dialogue hosted by 
Georgia on February 12, 2012, Commissioner 
Füle signed an agreement providing an additional 
€20 million to support the reform process in 
Georgia.54 During the EURONEST Parliamentary 
Assembly Political Committee’s visit on February 
15, the European People’s Party asserted that 
the ‘national political harassment of President 
Saakashvili and his supporters has resulted in the 
outcome that the conditions for the EU-Georgia 
dialogue are not being met any more’.55
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister and 
his administration confi rmed that European 
integration is the key policy objective for Georgia. 
Current authorities also welcomed the Venice 
Commission’s assistance with constitutional 
revision and other legislative reforms.56 
52  For more analyses of the post-election situation in Georgia 
see ISFED’s reports on Monitoring the Developments in 
Local Self-Government Agencies following the October 1 
Parliamentary elections and the Reports from the Conference 
International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, ‘100 
Days in Government: Rule of Law and Human Rights’, ISFED 
Conference Report, accessed February 20, http://www.isfed.ge/
eng/.
53  European Commission, ‘Catherine Ashton travels to Georgia’, 
Press Release Rapid IP/12/1263, accessed April 4, 2013, http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1263_en.htm.
54  European Commission, ‘Informal Eastern Partnership Dialogue 
in Georgia: Advancing European values’, Press Release Rapid 
MEMO/13/100, accessed April 4, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-13-100_en.htm.
55  European People’s Party, ‘EPP Georgia: EPP shocked by violent 
acts against UNM parliamentarians; conditions for EU-Georgia 
dialogue not anymore meet’, EPP Press Release, accessed 
February 20, 2013, http://www.epp.eu/sites/default/fi les/content/
press_releases/pdf/Georgia130213.pdf.
56 Council of Europe, ‘Venice Commission and Georgia Agree to 
Co-operate on Constitutional Revision and Legislative Reforms’, 
Venice Commission webpage, accessed February 20, 2013, http://
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?id=1655.
IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and C
entral Asia
15
Furthermore, they agreed to the implementation 
of a mission to observe the trials and further 
investigation into accusations of selective justice 
by ODIHR.57 These steps are intended to enhance 
the transparency of the government’s actions.
The February visit of Commissioner for Home 
Affairs Cecilia Malmström was accompanied by 
the presentation of the visa liberalisation plan 
for Georgia.58 The post-election situation paints 
a mixed picture of Georgia’s democratisation 
level. While the peaceful transfer of power 
presents a powerful argument for Georgia’s 
further democratisation, the fi rst few months of 
Ivanishvilli’s government indicated instances of 
selective justice and lack of political willingness 
to pursue constructive cohabitation. As stressed 
in the Council’s February 2013 conclusions, ‘the 
pace of reforms will determine the intensity of 
cooperation, and partners most engaged in reforms 
will benefi t most from their relationship with the 
EU’.59 The 2013 presidential elections will be an 
important indicator of Ivanishvilli’s intent and 
political commitment to further democratisation.60 
4.2 The 2012 Parliamentary elec-
tions in Armenia 
Since 1996, none of the elections held in Armenia 
have met international standards. The parliamentary 
elections in 2007 and the presidential elections in 
2008 showed some improvements, but serious 
problems relating to vote count, restricted media 
access and abuse of administrative resources were 
still widely recorded.61 In both cases, the election 
57  OSCE, ‘OSCE/ODIHR starts trial monitoring work in Georgia’, 
OSCE Press Release, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.
osce.org/odihr/99716.
58  European Commission, ‘Commissioner Malmström presents 
Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation with Georgia’, Press Release 
IP/13/156, accessed April 4, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-156_en.htm.
59  Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the 
Eastern Partnership’, 3222nd Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 
accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135513.pdf.
60  For further analysis of the new Georgian authorities see 
Matusiak, M., ‘Georgia: 100 days of the new government’, Centre 
for Eastern Studies EastWeek, accessed February 25, 2013, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-02-20/georgia-
100-days-new-government.
61  OSCE/ODIHR’s reports are available at http://www.osce.org/
results were rejected by opposition parties and 
sparked street protests. In 2008, protests resulted 
in violent clashes with the police, involving 
numerous casualties and political arrests. A state of 
emergency was declared, accompanied by further 
restrictions to the freedom of expression and 
assembly. Nevertheless, EU-Armenia relations 
progressed with the launch of negotiations on the 
Association Agreement in July 2010. 
In February 2011 the events of the Arab Spring 
triggered street protests in Yerevan with the 
oppositionist Armenian National Congress  led by 
the former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan calling 
on the success of revolutions organised in Tunisia 
and Egypt. 62The Armenian government responded 
with a relaxation of the measures implemented 
during the 2008 crackdown: the remaining 
political prisoners were released, the restriction 
on the freedom of assembly in Yerevan’s Freedom 
Square was lifted and investigations into casualties 
were reopened. These steps were perceived as a 
consequence of international pressure rather than 
as demonstrating President Sargsyan’s regime’s 
commitment to democracy. Nonetheless, they 
resulted in the intensifi cation of cooperation 
between the EU and Armenia. In September 2011, 
the European Commission proposed opening visa 
facilitation talks with Armenia63, and the offi cial 
dialogue was launched in February 2012.64 
In recent years, Armenia has demonstrated a 
growing willingness to move toward European 
integration, carrying out reforms in sectors such 
as energy, transport and business65. The bilateral 
political dialogue has intensifi ed accordingly. 
odihr/elections/armenia, accessed April 26, 2013. 
62  Grigoryan, M., ‘Armenia: Egypt events energizing opposition in 
Yerevan, Euroasia.net, February 03, 2011, accessed May 29, 2013, 
http://www.tert.am/en/news/2011/02/03/yerevanopposition/.
63  European Commission, ‘The Commission proposes to open 
negotiations on Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements 
with Armenia’ Press Release IP/11/1053, accessed April 4, 2013, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1053_en.htm. 
64  Delegation of the EU to Armenia, ‘Travel to the EU to become 
easier’, Delegation website, accessed April 4, 2013.  http://
eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/press_corner/all_news/
news/2012/2012-02-23_en.htm.
65  Iryna Solonenko, ed, European Integration Index for Eastern 
Partnership Countries, (IRF and OSF, 2012), 36. Also available 
online: http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/fi les/EaP%20
Index%202012_0.pdf.)
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Additionally, the fi nancial assistance allocated 
to Armenia under the ENPI in the period 
2011-2013 amounted to €157 million, twice 
the amount allocated in the previous period.66 
However, as indicated in the EaP Index, ‘the 
progress reported refers more to intention, than 
to actual improvements’.67 The Freedom House 
ranking characterises  Armenia as ‘partially 
free’, emphasizing, inter alia, the lack of media 
freedom.68
Pre-election assessment
The 2012 elections were held under a new 
electoral code, adopted in 2011, which, though 
an improvement over its predecessor did not 
incorporate suggestions made by opposition 
parties. Both OSCE/ODIHR interim reports on the 
pre-election period noted a vibrant and competitive 
environment with a generally sound legislative 
framework under the new electoral code as well 
as balanced media coverage. Most of the reported 
violations concerned the misuse of administrative 
resources.69 The campaign centred on the issue of 
electoral integrity and revealed a deep mistrust 
within the Armenian society.70 In the statement on 
the pre-election visit issued on March 14, 2012, 
the PACE delegation acknowledged the vibrant 
electoral environment but also voiced concerns 
regarding the accuracy of voting lists. President 
Sargsyan’s declarations of holding the freest and 
fairest elections in Armenia’s history were mostly 
66  New fi nancing agreements for reforms in Armenia (Yerevan, 
September 27, 2012), accessed April 4, 2013, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-12-1035_en.htm.
67  Iryna Solonenko, ed, European Integration Index for Eastern 
Partnership Countries, (IRF and OSF, 2012), 37. Also available 
online: http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/fi les/EaP%20
Index%202012_0.pdf)
68  Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2012’, Report, accessed 
February 20, 2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/
armenia.
69  OSCE/ODIHR, ‘Election Observation Mission Republic of 
Armenia Parliamentary Elections’ 
 Interim Report No. 1 10–16 January 2013, accessed April 2, 
2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia; OSCE/
ODIHR, ‘Election Observation Mission Republic of ‘Armenia 
Parliamentary Elections’ Interim Report No. 2, accessed April 2, 
2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia.
70  For further details see European Friends of Armenia, ‘Poll: A 
Snapshot of Pre-Electoral Armenia Main fi ndings’, (2013), 
accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.eufoa.org/uploads/
OpinionPoll_EN.pdf.
perceived as attempts to secure further fi nancial 
assistance from international actors. 
Elections assessment 
The elections were held on May 6, 2012 with a 
turnout of 62.3%.The ruling Republican Party 
won 44.02% of the votes, followed by its current 
coalition partner, Prosperous Armenia Party 
(30.12%). The opposition Armenian National 
Congress block obtained 7.08%, Heritage party 
5.76%, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
Dashnaksutyun 5.67% and Ornats Yerkir party 
5.51%. According to the joint preliminary 
statement by the OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA, 
PACE, and EP, the elections were conducted 
within ‘an improved legal framework [and]were 
characterised by a competitive, vibrant and largely 
peaceful campaign, which was, however, marked 
by a low level of confi dence in the integrity of 
the process.’71The observers pointed out that 
among others the implementation of the Electoral 
Code, the quality of the voter lists, the use of 
administrative resources, and the application of 
procedures by the Central Election Commission 
still fell short of international standards.
The Armenian Human Rights Defender 
generally supported this positive assessment, 
stating that the recorded level of violations, namely 
the abuse of administrative powers, violence 
against journalists and observers, instances of 
vote buying and problems with vanishing stamps, 
did not threaten the fi nal results and demonstrated 
progress compared to the previous election 
performance.72 A statement by non-governmental 
group ‘It’s Your Choice’ similarly regarded the 
election performance as progress, despite the 
recorded irregularities. 73 
71  OSCE/ODIHR, ‘Republic of Armenia Parliamentary Elections’, 
Final Report, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.osce.org/
odihr/91643. For other assessment see Council of Europe Ad 
hoc Committee of the Bureau, ‘Observation of the parliamentary 
elections in Armenia’, Election observation report Doc. 12937, 
accessed April 4, 2013, http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-
DW-XSL.asp?fi leid=18720&lang=EN.
72  European Friends of Armenia, ‘The Armenian Human Rights 
Defender’s Ad-hoc Report on the Parliamentary Elections 2012’, 
Ad-hoc Report, accessed April 4, 2013,  http://www.eufoa.org/
uploads/Ad-hoc%20Report%20of%20Ombudsman%20on%20
2012%20Parliamentary%20Elections.pdf.
73  It’s Your Choice, ‘On the results of IYC’s monitoring mission 
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A group of eleven local NGOs published one 
of the most critical assessments, pointing out 
‘perpetual sophistication and “improvement” of 
election fraud mechanisms’ and characterising 
the elections as ‘yet another failure of Armenia 
to honour her international commitments of 
implementing democratic reforms’.74 The special 
report by Policy Forum Armenia referred to the 
problem of election fraud as ‘not gone but instead 
transformed into less obvious and observable 
forms, while remaining largely outcome-
neutral’.75 A statistical analysis provided evidence 
of widespread electoral manipulation to the 
advantage of the incumbent authorities. 
The election performance demonstrated the 
growing capacity of civil society in Armenia, 
in particular the increasing civic activism of the 
youth76 and the use of modern technologies such 
as the joint IDitord Platform by Media Diversity 
Institute and Transparency International Armenia. 
The latter, a website in form of a digitalized map 
of Armenia providing citizens a platform for 
reporting and posting elections-related violations, 
proved to be a successful self-policing tool of 
election violations.77
EU’s response
In their joint statement, High Representative 
Ashton and Commissioner Füle praised the 2012 
elections as ‘progress towards more transparent 
and competitive elections’ and called for a 
‘constructive dialogue between authorities and 
the opposition as an important tool consolidating 
during the RA National Assembly elections of May 6, 2012’, 
Preliminary Statement, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.
iyc.am/eng/documents/IYC_preliminar_y%20statement.pdf.
74  Policy Forum Armenia, ‘Special Report Armenia’s 2012 
Parliamentary Elections’, Special Report, accessed April 4, 2013, 
http://www.pf-armenia.org/press-release/pfa-special-report-
armenias-2012-parliamentary-election.
75  Ibid.
76  Snip. I. ‘Youth NGOs in Armenia and the 2012 Parliamentary 
Elections’, Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 39, accessed April 4, 
2013, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CAD-39-11-13.
pdf.
77  For more details on the project see ‘Armenian Elections 
Monitoring: Crowdsourcing + Public Journalism + Mapping’. 
Internews Center for Innovation & Learning , accessed on May 29, 
2013, http://innovation.internews.org/blogs/armenian-elections-
monitoring-crowdsourcing-public-journalism-mapping.
democracy’.78 Armenian authorities were urged 
to address the shortcomings identifi ed by OSCE/
ODIHR ahead of the presidential elections 
scheduled for 2013.79 These words were echoed 
by Krzysztof Lisek, the head of the EP’s election 
delegation, who noted that, for Armenia, this was 
only ‘the beginning of the process, not the end.’80
The generally positive assessment of the 
elections prompted the EU to apply its ‘more 
for more’ response, which was confi rmed by 
the President of the European Council, Herman 
van Rompuy, during his visit to Yerevan in 
July 2012. His acknowledgment of Armenia’s 
progress on democratic reform coincided with the 
announcement of additional fi nancial assistance 
and the offi cial start of preparations for a donor 
conference. The Annual Action Programme 
2012 for Armenia, announced in August 2012, 
assigned €60 million for judicial reform and 
the strengthening of the country’s institutional 
capacity in support of the Association Agreement 
and DCFTAs negotiations.81 A further €15 
million were assigned later that year in a clear 
manifestation of ‘more for more’ under the EaP 
Integration and Cooperation Programme.82 
In September 2012, the EU signed two additional 
fi nancing agreements worth €43 million with 
Armenia.83 Commissioner Füle also proposed 
78  High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle, ‘On the 
Parliamentary elections in Armenia on 6 May 2012’, Statement A 
212/12, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135599.pdf.
79  Ibid.
80 Links Analysis, ‘Armenian Elections: International Monitors 
look at the bright side, leaving the Armenians to deal with the 
dark side’, Caucasus Elections Watch May 12, 2012, accessed 
April 4, 2013,  http://electionswatch.org/2012/05/12/armenian-
elections-international-monitors-look-at-the-bright-side-leaving-
the-armenians-to-deal-with-the-dark-side/.
81  European Commission, ‘European Commission allocates new 
funding for judicial reform and economic integration in Armenia’, 
Press Release IP/12/918, accessed April 4, 2013,  http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-918_en.htm.
82  European Commission, ‘New fi nancing agreements for reforms 
in Armenia’, Press Release IP/12/1035, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-12-1035_en.htm. 
83  According to the Press Release IP/12/1035 mentioned above, 
these two documents arethe ‘Framework Programme in support 
of the EU-Armenia agreement’ (€19.1 million) and the ‘Support 
to the Government of Armenia for the implementation of the 
ENP Action Plan and the preparation for the future Association 
Agreement’ (€24 million).
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to upgrade the Armenia-EU Action Plan to an 
Association Agenda, which would involve a more 
advanced framework of cooperation focused on 
the implementation of AA provisions.
In October 2012, Armenia announced the 
removal of the visa requirement for EU citizens, 
followed by the initiation of visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements between the EU and 
Armenia.84 The intention was to increase the areas 
of cooperation between the EU and Armenia 
on immigration. As demonstrated above, the 
bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia 
signifi cantly intensifi ed in the aftermath of the 
2012 elections.
4.3 The 2013 Presidential Elections 
in Armenia 
Ahead of the 2013 presidential elections, the 
EU stressed the importance that the election 
performance meets international standards. The 
main criteria for a positive assessment would be the 
OSCE’s evaluation, with particular reference to the 
shortcomings identifi ed during the parliamentary 
elections in May 2012.85 The offi cial declaration 
by Armenian President Sargsyan pledged ‘to 
transform registered progress into a fi rm trend 
and to hold free, fair, transparent and democratic 
presidential elections’86. Nonetheless, the pre-
election period was marked by the emergence of an 
increasingly uneven playing fi eld. The revocation 
of the immunity and formal charging of Vartan 
Oskanian, leader of the opposition Prosperous 
Armenia Party (PAP) and former Foreign Minister 
of Armenia, sparked fears of politically motivated 
misuse of the state judiciary.87  The major 
84  The latter agreement would reduce the number of documents 
needed for visa application,thus lowering the costs involved in the 
application process. Certain groups such as offi cial delegations, 
scholars, students and businessmen would obtain multi-entry 
visas.
85  Delegation of the EU to Armenia, ‘Speech on elections by the 
Head of the EU Delegation to Armenia’, Delegation website, 
accessed April 4, 2013. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
armenia/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/2012-02-23_en.htm.
86 Serzh Sargsyan, ‘Statement by President’, Statement at European 
People’s Party Convention, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.
a1plus.am/en/offi cial/2012/10/17/serzh.
87  NA, ‘Armenian politician charged’, Caucasus Elections Watch 
October 8, 2012, accessed April 4, 2013,  http://electionswatch.
org/2012/10/08/armenian-politician-charged/.
opposition parties decided to withdraw from the 
presidential competition; consequently,the pre-
election period could not provide a meaningful 
competitive environment.88 Although  on one of 
the candidates, Paruyr Hayrikyan, was threatened 
by an assassination attempt and another candidate 
went on hunger strike, the pre-electoral period can 
be regarded as ‘largely peaceful’89  and as generally 
lacking any substantial political debate on the 
merits of the respective candidates’ programmes.90
Election assessment 
The presidential elections held on February 
18, 2013 confi rmed the current president Serzh 
Sargsyan in power (59%) and Raffi  Hovannisian 
from Heritage Party as the runner up (37%). The 
joint report by OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA and 
PACE noted that:
‘Armenia’s presidential election was generally 
well-administered and was characterized by a 
respect for fundamental freedoms, including those 
of assembly and expression (…). [However,]
a lack of impartiality on the part of the public 
administration and the misuse of administrative 
resources resulted in a blurred distinction between 
the activities of the state and those of the ruling 
party’.91 
The rather positive tone of the assessment 
was echoed by Karin Woldseth, the Head of the 
PACE delegation, who stated that ‘there have 
been clear improvements in the electoral process 
since the previous presidential elections, and we 
have noted progress in many areas, including the 
88  In December 2012, the largest parties in the National Assembly 
– Prosperous Armenia, Armenian National Congress, and 
the Armenian Revolutionary – announced their decision to 
neither nominate candidates of their own nor support any other 
candidates. Furthermore, Armenia’s fi rst president Levon Ter-
Petrosyan announced his decision not to run for the presidency. 
89  OSCE ‘Armenian elections competitive and largely peaceful, but 
shortcomings undermined confi dence in the process, observers 
say’ Press Release, accessed May 29, 2013, http://www.osce.org/
odihr/elections/90334.
90  For more information on the re-election period see: Giragosian, 
R. ‘Special Pre-election Assessment’, RSC Special Briefi ng 
Summary Notes, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.
academia.edu/2499344/Regional_Studies_Center_RSC_Special_
Armenian_Pre-Election_Briefi ng. 
91  OSCE et al, ‘International Election Observation Mission 
Republic of Armenia — Presidential Election’, Statement of 
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, accessed March 20, 2013, 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/99675.
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media environment and the legal framework’.92 
She also noted that several important areas still 
needed to be improved, specifi cally with regard to 
ensuring full public trust in the electoral process. 
The EP’s assessment endorsed the preliminary 
OSCE/ODIHR fi ndings and pointed out a lack of 
substantive political debate and real competition.93
The elections were overseen by almost 6000 
observers representing 26 civic organisations, 
with most of these organisations presenting 
more critical assessments along with evidence 
of electoral manipulation and fraud.94 The 
press conference held by the OSCE/ODIHR 
observation team was interrupted by a domestic 
observer who objected to the positive assessment. 
The newly launched European Platform for 
Democratic Elections, a network of civic groups 
from the EU Member States, the EaP member 
states and Russia95, presented a rather critical 
evaluation, pointing out that the commitment 
of the electoral administration and the sound 
legislative framework had been the only two 
positive signs; generally, the elections had been 
hindered by a lack of political competition, low-
key campaigning and by the fact that the main 
opposition parties decided not to compete. The 
latter circumstance, in combination with instances 
of electoral fraud such as ballot stuffi ng, multiple 
92  OSCE, ‘Armenian election generally well-administered with 
fundamental freedoms respected, but some key concerns remain, 
international election observers say’, Press Release, accessed 
February 20, 2013,  http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/99676.
93  European Parliament AFET, ‘Armenia’s 2013 presidential 
elections: calm but no real competition’, Committees Committee 
on Foreign Affairs Press Release, accessed February 20, 
2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/
content/20130218IPR05915/html/Armenia’s-2013-presidential-
elections-calm-but-no-real-competition.
94  The two most extensive accounts of fraud in the Armenian 
elections have been given by Lena Nazaryan, an observer from the 
Europe in Law Association, and Narine Esmaeili, the Transparency 
International observer - for details see: Barsoumian, N. ‘A Story 
of Defi ance: Activists Reject International Observers’ Assessment 
of Election’, Armenian Weekly February 23, 2013, accessed 
February 24, 2013, http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/02/23/
a-story-of-defiance-activists-reject-international-observers-
assessment-of-election. 
95  NA, ’Domestic Election Observation in Europe - Strategy and 
Perspectives’, European Platform for Democratic Elections 
Policy Paper, accessed February 24, 2012,  http://www.european-
exchange.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Warsaw_10-13.12.12/
Policy_Paper_European_Platform_Election_Observation_en_
warsaw.pdf.
voting and intimidation of voters, resulted in a 
rather negative assessment.96 The statement by the 
NGO ‘It’s Your Choice’ noted some shortcomings 
with regard to ‘voter lists, vanishing stamps, 
presence of unauthorized people at the polling 
stations, violation of election procedures, cases of 
intolerance against proxies and monitors, isolated 
cases of illegal voting, cases of violation of 
confi dentiality of voting, attempts to vote instead 
of others, attempt of ballot stuffi ng in one of the 
polling stations, as well as certain inaccuracies 
connected with the location of polling stations.’97 
Nonetheless, it concluded that these shortcomings 
‘were not widely spread and according to CEC 
couldn’t have had an infl uence on election 
results’.98
The Iditord.org platform registered almost 350 
instances of irregularities with regard to voting 
lists, election bribery and pressure, and election 
day violations.99 Some instances of violence 
against journalists and journalists’ professional 
activities were also recorded.100 The preliminary 
analysis by Policy Forum Armenia challenged the 
level of violations registered by the OSCE/ODIHR 
observers, with their fi nal assessment ultimately 
‘[calling] into question the role of foreign election 
observers in the Armenian context, specifi cally 
their impartiality and ability to detect election 
fraud that is becoming ever more sophisticated.’101 
Their assessment mentioned a lack of competition, 
96  European Platform for Democratic Elections, ‘On Presidential 
Elections’, Statement, accessed February 24, 2013, http://hcav.
am/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/EPDE-Statement-Presidential-
Election-Armenia-18022013_fi nal_EN.pdf.
97  It’s Your Choice, ‘on Observation Mission during Presidential 
Elections’, Preliminary Statement, accessed February 21, 2013, 
http://www.iyc.am/eng/documents/Post-election_report_2013_
engl.pdf.
98  Ibid.
99  Another example is the hotline launched by the Civil Society 
Institute, which registered 54 calls and 60 additional reports from 
their observers – for details see NA, ‘Elections 2013. Summary 
of the calls received on the hotline’, Civil Society Institute NGO 
February 18, 2013, accessed April 4, 2013 http://hra.am/en/point-
of-view/2013/02/18/elections2013.
100  Barseghyan, A. ‘Armenian Presidential Election 2013: Incidents 
of Threats and Violence Against Journalists’, Media.Am, accessed 
February 20, 2013, http://media.am/en/presidential-elections-
professional-activities-of-journalists-hindered.
101 Policy Forum Armenia, ‘Armenian’s 2012 Parliamentary 
Election’, Report, accessed February 24, 2013, http://www.pf-
armenia.org/document/armenians-2012-parliamentary-election. 
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mistrust of electoral processes, widespread misuse 
of administrative resources and violence during 
the election day, and reports of duplicate voting, 
ballot stuffi ng, bribery, and substitute voting.102 
EU’s response
In their joint statement, High Representative Ashton 
and Commissioner Füle welcomed the OSCE/
ODIHR assessment and remarked that it had been 
a progress ‘to hold these presidential elections in 
line with international standards, notably through 
improved administration of the electoral process, 
ensuring possibilities for candidates to campaign 
freely and better quality of the voter lists’.103 They 
also emphasised their expectation that the OSCE/
ODIHR’s recommendations will be acted upon. 
104 This rather positive assessment indicates the 
further application of the ‘more for more’ approach 
as the EU’s response.105
The offi cial results were challenged by the 
runner up Raffi  Hovannisian and some of the 
opposition parties; Hovannisian launched a series 
of rallies across the country under the slogan of 
‘Barevolution’106. The widespread support for 
his actions clearly demonstrated the Armenian 
society’s lack of trust in the conduct of the 
presidential elections, the integrity of the electoral 
process, and, above all, in the current political 
system.107 Neither the 2012 parliamentary nor the 
102  Some of the issues were refl ected in the third OSCE/ODIHR 
report issued on March 2nd 2013. 
    OSCE, ‘Post-Election Interim Report’, Report, accessed 
February 20, 2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/99931. 
Furthermore, the OSCE/ODIHR election observerDermot Ahern 
issued a letter detailing some of the violations. Ahern, D., ‘OSCE 
Observer’s Surprised Letter On Elections’, Letter, accessed 
March 20, 2013, http://www.lragir.am/index.php/eng/0/politics/
view/29237.
103  The High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle, ‘On 
elections in Armenia’, Joint Statement A 212/12, accessed May 
4, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/136186.pdf.
104  Ibid.
105  Preliminary indications can be found in the 2013 Progress Report 
presented by Commissioner Füle on March 20, 2013. During the 
press conference, he also reported progress on the organisation of 
a donor conference for Armenia.   
106  This is a combination of an Armenian and an English word. It 
means “the revolution of greetings” and is supposed to emphasise 
the peaceful character of the struggle.
107  Hovannisian tried to challenge the results before the Highest 
Court, which on March 14, 2013 upheld the fi nal results. NA, 
2013 presidential elections fully met international 
standards for democratic elections. Nevertheless, 
the 2012 election was met with additional fi nancial 
assistance by the EU and further facilitation 
of the Association Agenda, in particular of the 
visa liberalisation. The EU’s rather positive 
assessment on the basis of the OSCE/ODIRH 
preliminary reports was primarily owed to the 
progress that had been made in comparison 
with the 2008 presidential elections and did not 
necessarily refl ect the political commitment of 
the incumbent authorities to further the country’s 
democratisation. 
4.4 The 2012 Parliamentary Elec-
tions in Ukraine
From the 2004 Orange Revolution until 
recently, Ukraine has demonstrated ‘a habit 
of good elections’108. The 2010 presidential 
elections, which were assessed by the OSCE as 
an ‘impressive display of democracy’,109 gave 
hope for the continuation of the democratic 
developments triggered by the 2004 presidential 
elections. However, recent developments 
involving a deterioration of democratic 
standards have brought Ukraine to the attention 
of the international community. Therefore, the 
preparation and conduct of the 2012 parliamentary 
elections became an important test of democracy.
For the EU, the parliamentary elections of 2012 
were to be ‘a litmus test of Ukraine’s democratic 
credentials’110, the two-year incumbency of 
president Yanukovich having been marked by 
an increasing level of corruption, an emergence 
‘Decision 2013: Highest Court upholds Sargsyan victory’, Armenia 
Now March 14, 2013, accessed March 14, 2013, http://www.
armenianow.com/vote_2013/44461/armvote13_constitutional_
court_decision_raffi _hovannisian_serzh_sargsyan.
108  High Representative, ‘After EU-Ukraine Ministerial’, Euronest 
Blog, accessed February 20, 2013,  
 http://euronest.blogspot.com.es/2010/10/remarks-by-hrvp-
ashton-after-eu-ukraine.html.
109  Turner, L. ‘Why the election strengthens Ukraine’s EU case’, 
Foreign and Commonwealth offi ce blog, accessed April 4, 2013, 
http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/leighturner/2010/02/12/why-the-election-
strengthens-ukraines-eu-case.
110 The High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle, ‘On 
the upcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine’, Press Release 
MEMO/12/857, accessed May 4, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-12-857_en.htm.
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of the ‘family’ notion111, pressure on the mass 
media112, and the emergence of selective justice 
as demonstrated by the example of former Prime 
Minster Tymoshenko and former Interior Minister 
Yuriy Lutsenko. 
The trials of Tymoshenko and Lytsenko113 were 
criticized regularly by the OSCE PA, PACE and 
EP as well as by other EU institutions. At the same 
time, the EU was the only entity that had political 
leverage with its ability to postpone the signing of 
the long-awaited Association Agreement. While 
the EU failed to convince President Yanukovych 
to adhere to democratic values, he in turn did not 
manage to convince EU leaders to proceed with 
the AA’s signing and subsequent implementation. 
In March 2012, the AA was initialised in 
Brussels114, followed by the initialisation of the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
on July 19, 2012. The subsequent signing was 
made conditional on ‘the compliance of the 2012 
parliamentary elections with the international 
standards and follow-up actions, progress in 
addressing the issue of selective justice and 
preventing its recurrence, implementation of 
reforms defi ned in the jointly agreed Association 
Agenda’.115 Nevertheless, instances of selective 
justice have become a major factor in the 
deterioration of EU-Ukraine relations; they are 
111 This term is widely used in the Ukrainian and meanwhile in 
the European mass media to depict the benefi ts and preferential 
treatment enjoyed by Yanukovich’s family and friends.
112 This was also reported by Reporters Without Borders in the 
World Press Freedom Index, which placed Ukraine on the 116th 
position in the ‘Diffi cult Situation’ category, preceeded by Peru 
and followed by Cambodia. Reporters Without Borders, ‘World 
Press Freedom Index: Dashed hopes after spring’, Press Freedom 
Index 2013, accessed April 4, 2013, http://en.rsf.org/press-
freedom-index-2013,1054.html .
113 Tymoshenko has been sentenced to seven years in prison 
for ‘criminal abuse’ during her term as prime minister, and 
Lutsenko is serving a sentence of four years for abuse of offi ce 
and embezzlement. The latter was pardoned by the President of 
Ukraine, Yanukovich and was set free on April 7, 2013.
114 Initialisation is a technical procedure, during which the parties 
involved verify the fi nal text of the agreement. It usually precedes 
the offi cial signing and the subsequent stage of ratifi cation. The 
latter two are highly political processes, while the former is purely 
technical.   
115 This statement is taken from the Factsheet prepared by the 
Council for the EU-Ukraine Summit, which was held on February 
25, 2013. However, it was articulated for the fi rst time in the 
Council Conclusions from December 10, 2012. 
perceived by the EU and by the international 
community as attempts to eliminate opposition 
fi gures prior to the parliamentary elections. 
Therefore, the 2012 election performance 
became an important indicator for the survival of 
Ukraine’s unstable democracy. 
Pre-election assessments 
Ukraine lost ground in most rankings and indexes 
evaluating the level of democracy in the country. 
Freedom House noted that – in preparation for 
the elections in 2011 – ‘Yanukovych launched 
a systematic campaign to eliminate any viable 
opposition to the ruling Party of the Regions 
ahead of parliamentary elections set for 2012’.116 
Although Ukraine has remained among ‚partially 
free’ states, Freedom House experts have lowered 
its ranking by one point (from 3 to 4) due to 
‚the authorities’ efforts to crush the opposition, 
including the politicized use of the courts, a 
crackdown on media, and the use of force to break 
up demonstrations.117 
The OSCE/ODIHR pre-election report brought 
to attention a number of improvements stemming 
from the new electoral law. Nevertheless, it also 
mentioned alarming shortcomings and reported 
several cases of violence against candidates 
and campaign staff as well as an absence of 
mechanisms for monitoring compliance with 
provisions for balanced media coverage.118 
Based on this assessment, the EU expressed its 
concern about the lack of political pluralism. In 
the joint statement by High Representative Ashton 
and Commissioner Füle, Ukrainian authorities 
were urged to follow up on the fi ndings of the 
OSCE report. Furthermore, they were encouraged 
to ensure political pluralism on public television, 
full transparency of the activities of the Central 
Election Commission, and to create an inclusive 
election environment.
116 Freedom House, ‘Freedom House Report on Ukraine for 2012’, 
Report, accessed April 4, 2013,  http://www.freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2012/ukraine. 
117 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic 
Breakthroughs in the Balance’, Report, accessed April 4, 2013, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%20
2013%20Charts%20and%20Graphs%20for%20Web.pdf.
118 OSCE, ‘Interim Report No. 1 conducted by OSCE 12–28 
September 2012’, Report, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.
osce.org/odihr/94829.
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Election Assessment
The elections were held on October 28, 2012. The 
fi nal results were close to the exit polls’ prediction, 
with the Ruling Party winning one-third of the 
votes, the Fatherland Party, previously led by the 
former Prime Minister Timoshenko, receiving 
25,5% and the Communist Party receiving 13,2%. 
The two newcomers, UDAR and Svoboda, 
enjoyed signifi cant support. UDAR, led by former 
boxer Klitschko, obtained 14%, while the ultra-
right party Svoboda received 10,4%. The latter 
two formed the United-Opposition.
The 2012 parliamentary elections were 
generally assessed positively in the reports but 
were criticized in the political discourse. In its 
Final Report, OSCE/ODIHR gave an overall 
positive assessment of the elections but also 
brought to attention some defi ciencies caused by 
the reinstated mixed electoral system and a lack of 
CEC involvement in the consistent implementation 
of the electoral law. The report also brought to 
attention the elimination of two strong opposition 
candidates, Tymoshenko and Lutsenko; as stated 
during the OSCE’s press conference, ‘one should 
not have to visit a prison to hear from leading 
political fi gures in the country.’119 The ‘virtual 
absence of editorial autonomy on television and 
limited political pluralism’ was noted as a strong 
defi ciency. 
The common assessment of the observer 
missions – OSCE/ODIHR OSCE PA, PACE, EP 
and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO 
PA) – was more critical. In their preliminary 
statement, the elections were characterized ‘by the 
lack of a level playing fi eld, caused primarily by 
the abuse of administrative resources [supporting 
the Party of the Regions], lack of transparency 
of campaign and party fi nancing, and lack of 
balanced media coverage’.120 The PACE President 
summed up the post-electoral developments in 
Ukraine as follows: ‘according to the observers, 
they have stated that democracy is regressing. That 
119  OSCE, ‘Ukrainian elections marred by lack of level playing 
fi eld, say international observers’, Press Release, accessed April 
4, 2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/96673.
120 OSCE et al., ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings and 
Conclusions’, Joint Statement, accessed April 4, 2013, http://
www.osce.org/odihr/96675.
means, not stagnating, but actually regressing.’121
Assessment by domestic observers
According to the CVU, the elections were 
characterized by systematic violations in 
most Ukrainian constituencies. Although the 
international observation mission did not note 
systemic violations in their reports, the CVU did 
register cases of bribery, as well as attempts to 
manipulate data during vote counting. Collected 
evidence includes photos of cast ballots as proof of 
vote bribery, attempts to carry ballots outside the 
voting premises and other illegal actions. No person 
implicated in the bribery was held responsible. 
The report also pointed out the obstruction of 
offi cial observers and other persons who had a 
right to be present at the meetings and the voting 
premises without permission or invitation from the 
Commission.122 
The other nation-wide network of 
organizations, OPORA, reported the systemic 
violation of electoral law and the decline of 
the democratic conduct of the election process 
in Ukraine. In addition to the already noted 
violations, the report emphasized the interference 
of law enforcement bodies in the process of vote 
counting in more than ten electoral districts123 as 
well as massive bribery and systemic violation 
of procedural norms. Therefore, according to 
OPORA, the elections could be classifi ed as not 
complying with democratic norms due to the 
lack of equal opportunities to participate in the 
elections, the unprecedentedly high number of 
‘technical parties’, the partiality of the electoral 
committees, as well as the unbalanced coverage of 
121 Donnelly, C. ‘Democracy in Ukraine regressing’ NewEurope 
(08.11.2012), accessed February 20, 2013,   http://www.neurope.
eu/article/democracy-ukraine-regressing.
122 CVU, ‘Звіт ВГО «Комітет виборців України» № 7 за 
результатами спостереження за виборами’ (Translation from 
Ukrainian: ‘Report # 7 on the Elections made by all-Ukrainian 
NGO ‘Committee of the Electors of Ukraine’), Report, accessed 
February 10, 2013, http://izbirkom.od.ua/content/view/5519/39/.
123 OPORA, ‘Підсумковий звіт за результатами 
загальнонаціонального спостереження за парламентськими 
виборами-2012’ (Translation from Ukrainian: Final Report 
on the All-national Monitoring of the Parliamentary Elections 
2012’), Final Report, accessed February 20, 2013, http://
oporaua.org/news/3573-pidsumkovyj-zvit-za-rezultatamy-
zagalnonacionalnogo-sposterezhennja-za-parlamentskymy-
vyboramy-2012.
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the parties and candidates in the mass media. 
Compared to the observation missions held by 
international organisations, the domestic network 
recorded signifi cant bribery during the process of 
casting ballots, which was not noted by several 
other missions. Even though both domestic 
organizations, but especially CVU, have a strong 
network across Ukraine, only ENEMO cooperated 
with the domestic networks.
EU’s response 
The fi rst offi cial EU reaction to the elections was 
the Joint Communication of Commissioner Füle 
and the High Representative Ashton on November 
12, 2012. They expressed concern about delays in 
the vote count and a lack of transparency in the 
electoral commissions. The statement noted that 
the shortcomings indicated in the OSCE/ODIHR 
interim reports had not been addressed, despite the 
fact that the Ukrainian authorities had agreed to 
cooperate. All things considered, there has been 
deterioration in several areas compared to the 
standards achieved in previous elections.’124
The subject of the Ukrainian elections was 
taken off the agenda of the Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting on November 19, 2012 due to the 
situation in Gaza and was consequently addressed 
at December’s Foreign Affairs Council. In its 
conclusions, the Council referred to the mixed 
picture of the parliamentary elections, which 
were characterised by deterioration of democratic 
standards in several areas. The statement also 
reiterated its strong concern about politically 
motivated convictions of former governmental 
offi cials, making their participation in the 
elections impossible. 
In Brussels, there was no clear agreement on 
how to proceed with Ukraine, especially with 
regard to the signing of the AA. On one hand, 
the OSCE/ODIHR assessment was generally 
positive, but on the other hand, it was alarming 
that the issues identifi ed in the pre-election period 
had not been addressed. Therefore, the EU took 
time for refl ection. As a short-term consequence, 
124 The High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle, 
‘On parliamentary elections in Ukraine’, Joint Statement 
MEMO/12/857, accessed February 20, 2013,  http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-857_en.htm.
Yanukovich was not invited to the Brussels, and 
the annual EU-Ukraine Summit was postponed 
indefi nitely.
The December Council Conclusions identifi ed 
three conditions, with which Ukraine has to 
comply: international standards and follow-up 
actions after the elections, progress in addressing 
the issue of selective justice and preventing its 
recurrence, and implementation of the reforms 
defi ned in the jointly agreed Association Agenda.125 
In the February 2013 Conclusions on the EaP, the 
Council repeatedly confi rmed these three areas as 
indicators of Ukraine’s European aspirations and 
a commitment to build a deep and sustainable 
democracy.126 The highly anticipated EU-Ukraine 
summit took place on February, 25 2013. In the 
joint statement, both sides acknowledged the 
importance of full Ukrainian compliance with the 
OSCE/ODIHR recommendations by establishing 
a reliable electoral legislation, insuring balanced 
media coverage, and addressing the inconclusive 
results in single mandate constituencies. 
The above analysis of the EU’s response to 
the 2012 Ukrainian elections does not clarify 
the renewed ENP’s conditionality. There is no 
real application of ‘less for less’ but rather a 
preservation of the status quo by postponing the 
signing of the AA and DCFTA. This, together 
with further fi nancial assistance from the EU, now 
depends on progress made by Ukraine.
125 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on 
Ukraine’, 3209th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, accessed 
February 20, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf.
126 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the 
Eastern Partnership’, 3222nd Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 
accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135513.pdf.
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5. Conclusions and Recom-
mendations 
The analysis of the EU’s response to the recent 
elections in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine has 
arguably clarifi ed the utilisation of conditionality 
under the new approach. The positive assessment 
of the 2012 Armenian and Georgian elections was 
translated by the EU into short-term incentives 
such as additional fi nancial assistance and further 
facilitation of the negotiations on the Association 
Agreements, including further trade and visa 
liberalisation. Furthermore, the medium-term 
incentives in Armenia were conditioned by the 
conduct of the 2013 presidential elections and in 
Georgia by a constructive period of cohabitation 
of the new prime minister and the president. 
Following the negative assessment of the Ukrainian 
elections, the EU’s response – the signing of the 
AA – was further conditioned by improvements 
on the problematic issues of electoral reform, 
application of selective justice, and progress on 
the reforms outlined by the Association Agenda. 
The EU did not invoke negative conditionality. 
Consequently, under ‘more for more’, the EU’s 
short- and long-term response evidenced stronger 
positive conditionality, facilitated by more fl exible 
funding. Nevertheless, there is still neither a clear 
defi nition nor are there indicators of negative 
conditionality. 
By basing its assessment on the OSCE/
ODIHR reports, the EU benchmarks the election 
performance against its performance in meeting 
international standards relative to previous 
elections, rather than benchmarking it against 
international standards as such. This approach 
explains the difference between the assessments 
of the Armenian and Ukrainian elections in 
2012: the Armenian elections showed substantial 
improvements with regard to democratic 
standards, while the Ukrainian elections were 
perceived as a step backwards. Even though 
electoral violations were recorded during the 
2012 Armenian parliamentary elections and the 
2013 presidential elections, they were nonetheless 
improvements compared to the 2008 presidential 
elections. This approach demonstrates a lack of 
precise and consistent standards for assessing 
election performance within the framework of the 
EU’s ‘more for more’ or ‘less for less’ response.
Whereas the task of the international election 
observers is to give a technical assessment of 
election performance, the EU could use the 
technical assessments as a base for further 
political evaluation of positive or negative 
democratic developments in the countries. 
Electoral assessments published by international 
actors play crucial a role in legitimising election 
results, however, it is only the EU that can 
incentivise those countries to comply with the 
recommendations stated in the technical reports. 
Using the OSCE/ODIHR technical reports as 
a base for the EU’s own assessment, the EU 
could further develop it into political evaluation 
on the democratic process achieved by a given 
EaP country in the process of preparation and 
conduction of the elections as well as taking into 
account post-electoral developments. For this 
a proper methodological framework would be 
required in order to make evaluation impartial. 
This political evaluation could be similarly 
structured as the evaluation published in form 
of the Progress Reports by the EEAS and the 
European Commission. Otherwise, the application 
of positive conditionality in the case of partially 
fl awed elections can create the perception that the 
EU legitimises the manipulation of elections. This 
enables incumbent authorities to claim victory 
without being accused of serious violations by 
international organisations. Only by introducing 
a political aspect to election assessments it is 
possible to refl ect the authorities’ political will 
to conduct genuinely free elections as well as 
the domestic political capacity to form viable 
alternatives. Ultimately, the EU should assess the 
political willingness of the incumbent authorities 
to implement a genuine democratic transition.
Positive conditionality should only be 
applied when election performance fully meets 
international standards. In case of partially 
positive assessments, the EU should further 
condition its response by implementing the 
OSCE’s recommendations. The European 
Commission, EEAS and the EU Delegations 
should be closely involved in the OSCE/ODIHR 
follow-up missions, and the recommendations 
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should be incorporated in the Association Agendas 
and any new Roadmaps in order to create precise 
indicators of post-election performance. This 
should foster further policy convergence of 
election performance in terms of legislation and, 
most of all, implementation. 
The analysis of the election performance 
highlighted three main problems: election 
manipulation, lack of public trust in the election 
process and the underdeveloped political scene. In 
all elections analysed, manipulation of elections 
created an uneven playing fi eld. The fact that 
political parties are based on the personalities 
of their leaders and not on economic, social and 
political programmes emerges as the greatest 
impediment to further democratisation of these 
countries. The lack of funding for political parties 
and their insuffi cient institutional capacity is one 
of the key factors preventing the emergence of 
an inclusive political scene that could produce 
viable alternatives to incumbent authorities. 
Furthermore, with the pre-election periods 
lacking real debate, elections are dominated by 
personalities and not political programmes. The 
EU should further support the development of the 
political scene in its neighbouring countries. A 
stronger emphasis needs to be put on bilateral and 
multilateral assistance to support the development 
of political pluralism and foster genuine 
competition, which is essential for the existence 
of a ‘deep and sustainable democracy’. The newly 
launched European Endowment for Democracy 
should target political parties and support their 
transformation from highly personalised platforms 
into programme-based organisations. European 
political groups should assist their partners in the 
neighbouring countries with capacity building 
and political development. They could also exert 
additional pressure on their partners to commit 
to genuine democratic elections by jointly 
developing electoral codes of conduct.
The EU’s declared emphasis on the role of 
civil society has still not been put into practice as 
far as EaP’s election performance is concerned. 
The EU’s evaluation of the election process 
should present a more extensive assessment 
of both governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. Domestic NGOs should not only 
be targeted when they provide election assistance 
but should also be included in the formulation 
of the election assessment and subsequent 
recommendations. Under the new approach, 
the aim was to ‘move beyond simply providing 
fi nancial support to non-state actors, towards 
enhancing engagement with civil society and 
increasing its involvement in the policy dialogue 
at the partner country level’127. Therefore, the EU 
should streamline the proposed policy dialogue 
by supporting instruments aimed at establishing 
dialogue between government and civil society in 
the respective countries.
Civil society needs further development with 
regard to election performance; for example, the 
development of a national Task Force under the 
leadership of the EU Delegation would act as an 
umbrella, uniting efforts of various international 
and local organisations and allowing for greater 
involvement of civil society, maximisation of 
available funds, and a more comprehensive 
approach. It could become a hub for coordination 
between interested organisations, providing 
assessments of needs, technical assistance, 
training management, and most of all a platform 
for knowledge and best practice sharing. At the 
same time, it would increase awareness of the 
political context in the targeted country and would 
create space for discussions on improvements, 
for example the integration of technology into 
the election system. Additionally, joint press 
conferences would create a space for presenting 
and discussing fi ndings and recommendations. The 
presence of NGOs would further the perception 
of impartial and non-partisan assessment. 
Furthermore, such cooperation would result in a 
harmonisation of recommendations across various 
organisations. Finally, the Task Force would 
become an additional actor involved in monitoring 
the implementation of recommendations. 
Since the ruling parties of the neighbouring 
countries joined the European political groups 
as observers, the impartiality of the European 
Parliament’s observing missions can be called 
127  European Commission, ‘Action Fiche for Neighbourhood Civil 
Society Facility 2011’, Notes, accessed February 20, 2013, http://
ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2011/af_aap-spe_2011_
enpi.pdf.
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into question. The EP’s delegation should be 
expanded to include representatives of the EU 
Neighbourhood EAST Parliamentary Assembly 
(EURONEST); this expansion would not only 
strengthen the neutrality and non-partisan 
character of the subsequent assessment but would 
also further the feeling of joint ownership within 
the EaP framework. Therefore, the recently 
launched EaP Civil Society Forum Election 
Task Force should be used to further develop 
the civil society’s capacity and strengthen its 
role in EaP’s election assessment. Finally, based 
on the already functioning Visa Liberalisation 
Index128, an Election Performance Index129could 
be created to serve as an additional watchdog 
tool for civil society. The index would rank 
countries of the EaP in terms of their performance 
in a number of fi elds, including various aspects 
of election administration as covered by the 
OSCE/ODIHR assessments. While the current 
approach demonstrates a greater commitment 
to democratisation and a willingness to apply 
stronger and more consistent conditionality , the 
EU still needs to ensure that election assistance and 
performance is translated into democratic change 
through a comprehensive strategy that would 
foster the emergence of a ‘deep and sustainable 
democracy’ in its neighbouring countries. 
128  Eastern Partnership Visa Liberalisation Index is an 
assessment of the progress in visa liberalisation efforts conducted 
by a team of experts from the countries of the EaP and Poland. 
For details see the website htt p://monitoring.visa-free-europe.
eu/ (accessed March 10, 2012). 
129  A similar project has been implemented with regard to US 
elections. The Pew Charitable Trusts released the fi rst assessment 
of the US states’ election administration, in which it attempted 
to rank them by benchmarking their performance against 17 
indicators, including the accuracy of voting technology and the 
percentage of voters experiencing problems with registering 
or casting an absentee ballot. For details on the project see the 
website htt p://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/electi ons-
performance-index-85899445029 (accessed March 10, 2013).
